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Were Gallup to poll the American people on the question, "What is
cybersecurity?" it seems a fair guess that the following answers would
be the most common: "Something to do with computer safety,"
"Preventing identity theft," and "I don't know." Few would likely refer
to anything like "the body of technologies, processes and practices
designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data [and the
critical infrastructures on which they rely] from attack, damage or
unauthorized access."1 Yet, the likely poll answers and the more
encompassing formal definition have something in common. All
would probably suggest to the everyday citizen that the question,
"How shall we pursue cybersecurity?" is a question best left to
experts-preferably experts with computer science or engineering
degrees.
The total abdication of cybersecurity policy to "experts," however,
has been, and continues to be, a profound mistake. Given the ubiquity
of computer networks and our reliance as a society on their integrity
and robustness, the quality of cybersecurity is an issue that affects
*Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University.
1 What is Cybersecurity?, WHATIS.COM (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/cybersecurity.html (cited approvingly by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in its guidance on corporate disclosures relative to
cybersecurity); see SEC CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: ToPIc No. 2 CYBERSECURITY, SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM'N Div. OF CORP. FIN. (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov,/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
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everyone's interests. Excluding the general public from any
meaningful voice in cyber policymaking removes citizens from
democratic governance in an area where our welfare is deeply
implicated. Further, as the papers in this volume amply testify, the
"technologies" and the "processes" entailed in cybersecurity are costly,
likely requiring significant public investment.2 Cybersecurity builds on
"practices" that include routines and procedures in the hands of
ordinary individual computer users. 3 Mobilizing citizen backing for
the requisite public investment in cybersecurity, and even more for
the common commitment to adopt responsible computing habits, will
be substantially more difficult if people have virtually no
understanding of what they are being asked to do or to support.
Finally, the concern over decision-making competence is easy to
overstate. The design of cybersecurity involves technical choices
requiring specialized competence, just as does the implementation of
environmental policy, biomedical research policy, or, for that matter,
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. But the design of
cybersecurity also implicates a series of choices among competing
values and priorities that are the ordinary stuff of politics. The lay
public's inability to address strictly technical or expert questions does
not mean it is incompetent to weigh competing policy answers to the
general question, "What should the government do?"4
Indeed, I would argue that an administration explicitly committed
to unprecedented levels of both transparency and collaborations
should regard cybersecurity as offering an ideal opportunity to engage
the public more meaningfully in policy deliberation than has so far
been the American norm. Models abound, both in other nations' use
of citizen consultations to involve the public in technology-related
policy making and in U.S. experience with citizen consultation in
2 For partial data on the government budgets allocated for cybersecurity, see Mark D.
Young, Cyber Operational Relationships in the United States Government, 8 ISJLP 270
(2012).
3 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., COMPUTER VIRUSES AND OTHER MALICIOUS
SOFIWARE: A THREAT TO THE INTERNET ECONOMY 151 (2009).
4 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC
CONSULTATION 118-19 (2009).
5 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21,
2009) ("My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in
Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of
transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our
democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.").
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environmental decision making.6 Not only do such models offer the
prospect of improving our cyber policy posture through public
engagement, but meaningful citizen engagement in this area of
complex decision making could provide a pivotal model for how to
deepen the meaning of citizenship in the digital age.
In Part I of this essay, I will revisit the other contributions to this
volume to illustrate the range of policy tradeoffs that could sensibly be
opened up for public discussion. In Part II, I will discuss what ought
to be the aims behind any project to incorporate public deliberation
into cyber policymaking. Part III will review models of public input
that could give lay citizens a meaningful recommending voice in the
formulation of government cyber policy, and suggest the model best
suited to meet the aims set forth in Part II. Part IV discusses the
typical objections to genuinely collaborative public input, but argues
that cyber policy provides an exceptional opportunity to set a
precedent for the institutionalization of collaborative public
involvement in policy making more generally.
I. CYBER POLICY AND PUBLIC VALUES
The obvious threshold difficulty in creating a cybersecurity regime
that resembles a "kinetic world" security regime is one of attribution:
it is often exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to discern the source
of aggressive efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of cyber systems.7
That fact directly implies that any cyber policy discussion is sooner or
later going to focus on attribution, and set up a familiar debate
between champions of security and champions of privacy. Before even
contemplating how public input might be useful to that debate,
however, it is worth emphasizing that the typical security-versus-
privacy frame barely scratches the surface in terms of what Americans
have at stake in the framing of cyber policy.
As a starting point, it is useful to note the contrast that the
National Research Council (NRC) has delineated between "cyber
attack" and "cyber exploitation." The former term "refers to the use of
deliberate actions . . . to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy
6 See, e.g., Johs Grundahl, The Danish Consensus Conference Model, in PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS CONFERENCES IN EUROPE 31, 31-40
(Simon Joss & John Durant eds., 1995).
7 See JEFFREY HUNKER, CREEPING FAILURE: How WE BROKE THE INTERNET AND WHAT WE
CAN Do To FIX IT 84-85 (2010); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 20 (William
A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
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adversary computer systems or networks or the information and/or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks."8 An
attempt to shut down an urban transportation system by disrupting
the computer programs that govern its operations would be such a
cyber attack. By contrast, cyber exploitation "is an intelligence-
gathering activity rather than a destructive activity."9 Its aim is to
secure unauthorized access to confidential information, while allowing
the computer system on which that information resides to run
normally. Cyber exploitation is more like espionage than warfare. Yet,
as the NRC notes, "[c]yber attack and cyber exploitation are often
conflated in public discourse," increasing the likelihood that policy
discussions about cyber exploitation are distorted by the kinds of
public anxiety stirred up by cyber attack scenarios.o
Policy making with regard to potential cyber attack-from both an
offensive and defensive posture-is rife with the sorts of value
questions on which informed citizens can make meaningful
contributions. Not least among them, as this volume well documents,
is the determination of appropriate responsibilities to be assigned to
civilian and military authorities in responding to a cyber attack. Mark
Young has sketched the ongoing evolution among federal entities,
both military and civilian, of a series of operational relationships in
cyber defense that he still regards as insufficiently mature to meet the
current cyber threat." He identifies the debate about the Defense
Department's appropriate role in protecting civilian networks as one
that should be discussed "openly and frequently."12
Other papers testify to the importance of this debate. As analyzed
by information scientist Martin Libicki, the seemingly reflexive
characterization of cyber space as a new military domain-reinforced
by the formal creation within the military of a cyber
"command"-runs the risk of skewing the emergence of cyber
doctrine in ways that are counterproductive for developing both
strategy and tactics.13 Yet, as Terrence Kelly and Jeffrey Hunker attest,
8 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 1o -11.
9 Id. at 1.
lo Id. at 32.
11 Young, supra note 2.
12 Id. at 299.
13 Martin Libicki, Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain, 8 ISJLP 321 (2012).
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there seems little doubt that the greatest reservoir in the federal
government of technical expertise regarding cyber attack sits with the
Department of Defense, on both the military and civilian sides.14 What
then is to be done in pursuit of the levels of efficiency, effectiveness,
transparency, and accountability that the public might appropriately
expect in this realm? How to organize multiple players to achieve
these competing goods is a subject that an informed public can and
should rationally discuss.
Critical value questions also attend the prospect of launching
cyber attacks from the U.S. The NRC has noted the imperfect match
between the nature of cyber conflict and the legal regime that attends
kinetic war making-the international laws of armed conflict, the
United Nations Charter, and the conventional modus vivendi between
Congress and the executive branch regarding the initiation of military
conflict generally.15 There is no reason why the public should be
excluded from meaningful discussions about how best to analyze
potential cyber attack scenarios within the existing framework, and
what new rules or doctrines need to be evolved to take account of the
new world of cyber weapons. This is especially so because, as the NRC
states:
U.S. cyber attacks that are directed against globally
shared infrastructure supporting the private sector
might have deleterious "blowback" effects on U.S.
private sector entities. Such effects might be direct, in
the sense that a U.S. cyberattack might propagate to
harm a U.S. firm. Or they might affect the supply chain
of a U.S. firm-a node in Zendia might support
communications between a key U.S. firm and a
supplier firm in Ruritania as well as military
communications in Zendia, and a disabling cyberattack
on that node might leave the U.S. firm without the
ability to order goods from the Ruritanian firm.16
In other words, U.S.-launched cyber attacks would likely risk serious
ramifications for ordinary Americans, as well as for our government
14 Terrence K. Kelly & Jeffrey A. Hunker, Cyber Policy-Institutional Struggle in a
Transformed World, 8 ISJLP 210 (2012).
15 see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 239-92.
16 Id. at 47.
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and for the international targets of our attacks. The public should be
afforded some form of democratic input before bearing those risks.
In this volume, Herbert Lin, a distinguished computer scientist
and major contributor to the NRC study, explains that decision
makers involved in cybersecurity are now working with scant
information about both the intentions and technical capacities of
likely cyber aggressors, thus prompting analysts to plan around worst-
case scenarios.17 He points out that, "[i]n the absence of metrics that
tie investment to capability (a difficult problem that has bedeviled the
cybersecurity community for forty years and remains unsolved
today)," analysts are left to make judgments on cyber preparedness
based on significantly subjective estimates of what is reasonable.18
There is no reason to exclude the public from such a discussion. This
is especially so, given that, as Dr. Lin elaborates, strategic responses to
cyber attack could assume two quite different forms: "passive" early
warning and defensive measures, and measures to "enhance rapid
recovery . . . and resilience . . . to deploy backup or alternative
capabilities; and to train organizations that might be affected by the
loss of cyber functionality to work without it."19 Dr. Lin concludes that
worst-case scenarios, if reasonable, would most likely prompt
emphasis on the latter forms of response. 20 Yet, for all the public
knows, millions of public dollars are being pumped into warning and
defense measures that are likely inadequate to respond to the very
scenarios prompting their development.
Of course, life is yet more complex because, as many papers in
this volume reflect, much of the digital infrastructure that supports
critical functions in U.S. civilian life is actually in the hands of private
firms.21 As a consequence, it is impossible to imagine any plausible
defense against cyber attack that does not significantly involve the
private sector. In May 2011, the Obama Administration made a
proposal for new legislation that would motivate private sector firms
17 Herbert Lin, Thoughts on ThreatAssessment in Cyberspace, 8 ISJLP 337 (2012).
18 Id- at 353.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21E.g., Mark MacCarthy, Government and Private Sector Roles in Providing Information
Security in the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 8 ISJLP 242 (2012).
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to improve their security preparedness.22 Under the Administration
proposal, the Department of Homeland Security would:
[W]ork with industry to identify the core critical-
infrastructure operators and to prioritize the most
important cyber threats and vulnerabilities for those
operators. Critical infrastructure operators would
develop their own frameworks for addressing cyber
threats. Then, each critical-infrastructure operator
would have a third-party, commercial auditor assess its
cybersecurity risk mitigation plans. Operators who are
already required to report to the Security and Exchange
Commission would also have to certify that their plans
are sufficient. A summary of the plan would be
accessible, in order to facilitate transparency and to
ensure that the plan is adequate. In the event that the
process fails to produce strong frameworks, DHS,
working with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, could modify a framework. DHS can also
work with firms to help them shore up plans that are
deemed insufficient by commercial auditors.23
Ink had barely dried on the proposal before the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce broadcasted its opposition. The Chamber immediately
declared: "Layering new regulations on critical infrastructure will
harm public-private partnerships, cost industry substantial sums, and
not necessarily improve national security."24 According to the
22 See Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Hon. John
Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives (May 12, 2011),
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/Cybersecurity-
letters-to-congress-house-signed.pdf (forwarding the proposal. The actual proposal is
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/law-
enforcement-provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf (last visited Mar. lo,
2012)).
23 THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 3 (May 12,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/fact-sheet-
administration-cybersecurity legislative-proposal.pdf.
24 Siobhan Gorman, Cybersecurity Plan Faulted, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424o527023o3654804576345772352365258.htm
(quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce, White House Security Proposal Moving from Risk
Management to Regulatory Overreach (May 2009)).
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Chamber, compliance with external audits would be "costly and time
consuming, particularly for small businesses."25 This cost-benefit
analysis, however, dramatically poses exactly the kind of tradeoff on
which a democratic society should have a broad-based dialogue. It is
certainly questionable whether private-public partnerships are likely
to improve security if the government has no significant leverage to
elicit cooperation from its private sector "partners." The Chamber's
point of view might or might not prove sound, but it ought not
represent the only public voice in a critical policy debate.
The issues on the cyber exploitation, or information security, side
are no less value-laden or ripe for public debate. As Mark MacCarthy's
paper points out, our financial systems constitute an important
domain in which to consider the appropriate respective roles for
government and the private sector.26 Dr. MacCarthy argues that the
proper locus for the legal imposition of security requirements is at the
federal, not the state level, and that mandatory requirements ought to
be limited to general principles, not specific implementation steps.27
He also argues against the utility of private rights of action against
financial firms that underinvest in cybersecurity.28 These are entirely
plausible positions; the preference for performance standards over
requirements for specific technologies now has a distinguished
pedigree in the literature-and politics-of regulatory reform.29 Yet,
efforts to enact sensible federal cybersecurity legislation appear to be
chronically stalled because the "deliberative process" has been
hijacked by special interests and partisan acrimony.30 Bringing the
public into the debates about both general regulatory philosophy and
specific legislative proposals might help Congress and federal agencies
break free of the inertia of inside-the-Beltway politics-as-usual.
25 Id.
26 MacCarthy, supra note 21.
271d. at 269-71.
28 Id. at 270.
29 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735,
51736 (Oct. 4, 1993) ("Each agency shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation
and shall, to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the
behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt.").
30 Aliya Sternstein, Political and Industry Wrangling Likely Will Delay Cybersecurity
Reforms, NEXTGOV.COM (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20110926_190 7.php.
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Because of the difficulty of attribution mentioned earlier, debates
concerning the nature and resolution of privacy-security tradeoffs
permeate discussions of both cyber attack and cyber exploitation.31
Greg Nojeim's paper highlights a handful of proposals that privacy
advocates have long challenged, including grants of government
authority to block or limit communications on private computer
networks, expansion of the government's monitoring authorities over
private networks, and the facilitation of electronic surveillance by
mandating technology designs that enable wiretapping.32 Jeffrey
Hunker, however, is advancing a proposal arguably further reaching
than any of these: the engineering of a new Internet that would build
security into its architecture, thus facilitating attribution.33 The
proposal is a fascinating one because the stakes are so high. On one
side, there would undoubtedly be concerns not only for the resulting
impacts on privacy, but also for the magnitude of public investment it
would take to engineer a new Internet and for the possibility that
increasing network management at a new Internet's "core" would
limit the Internet's power as a platform for innovation and universal
connection.34 On the other hand, Dr. Hunker holds out the prospect
that a new Internet would enable governments, businesses, and
individuals all to engage in data and communication activities with
greater confidence, efficiency, and security-virtues that could
significantly boost both the economy and our social and political life
more generally.35
A new Internet could be a great idea-or a terrible one-but the
public is never likely to focus on it unless there is a meaningful,
structured opportunity for informed citizens to learn about and
express themselves regarding the possibilities. Those firms currently
invested in owning or providing services over the current Internet
31 Ellen Nakashima, White House, NSA weigh cybersecurity, personal privacy, WASH.
POST, Feb. 27, 2012 at 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/white-house-nsa-weigh-cyber-security-personal-
privacy/2012/02/07/glQA8HmKeR story.html.
32 Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity: Ideas Whose Time Has Not Come-And Shouldn't, 8
ISJLP 4o8 (2012).
33 See generally HUNKER, supra note 7, at 204-23.
34 See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010)
(arguing the importance of the original architecture of the Internet to its power as a
platform for innovation).
35 HUNKER, supra note 7, at 208.
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likely constitute a sufficiently weighty inertial force to prevent serious
consideration of so ambitious a proposal within our usual official
public policy forums. Given the magnitude of cyber threat that
contributors to this volume have identified vis-A-vis our current
Internet, however, this is a debate worth having-a debate informed
by, but not limited to, experts in computer science, engineering,
information technology management, and public administration (on
both the civilian and defense sides).
II. THE AIMs OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN CYBER POLICY
The norm of public engagement is deeply embedded in the laws
and institutions of Western governments, but the precise mechanisms
of public engagement are highly varied. In general, the concept
"covers a broad range of interactions between government and civil
society to design, implement, and evaluate policies."36 Available
models include at least the following:37
* Referenda
* Public surveys
* Formal notice and comment filing opportunities
* Blogs
* Wikis
* "Serious games" and online simulations
* Public hearings
36 FRANS H.J.M. COENEN, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS:
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES FOR THE QUALITY OF
ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED DECISION-MAKING 3 (Frans H.J.M. Coenen, ed., 2008).
37 This list borrows from: id. at 15; FISHKIN, supra note 4; THOMAS DIETZ & PAUL C. STERN,
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING 49 (2008);
and MATT LEIGHNINGER, IBM CTR. FOR THE Bus. Gov'T, USING ONLINE TOOLS TO
ENGAGE-AND BE ENGAGED BY-THE PUBLIC (2011), available at
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Using%200nline%2oTools%20
tO%20Engage%20The%20Public o.pdf.
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* Consensus conferences
* Mediation
* Regulatory negotiation
* Citizen juries
* Planning cells
* Citizen advisory committees
* 2 1st Century "Town Halls" (as sponsored by
AmericaSpeaks)
* Deliberative polls
If cyber policy making is to involve public participation, a choice
among these models must be made. Any sensible design choice must
be guided by the aims that this particular public participation project
would be intended to accomplish.
The aims most often advanced in connection with public
participation are threefold: public education and mobilization, better
quality decisions, and enhanced decision-making legitimacy.38 In the
cyber realm, the aims of public education and mobilization seem
highly salient. The issues are complicated. The tradeoffs are subtle.
Greater public knowledge is a likely prerequisite to the kinds of
behavioral change among ordinary users that would enhance network
security. Greater public knowledge is also quite likely a prerequisite to
mobilizing political support for the levels of public investment
required to advance cybersecurity. It would thus seem imperative to
design public participation opportunities in the cyber policy realm to
maximize public awareness and knowledge acquisition.
What "better" decision making consists of in the cyber (or any
other) realm is ambiguous.39 In terms of efficiency, it might seem
obvious that the best cybersecurity decisions would be those that
achieve the most appropriate levels of network and critical
infrastructure security at the least cost. It may simply prove
38 COENEN, supra note 36, at 2.
39 Id. at 3-6.
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impossible, however, to ever make such an assessment persuasively.
Additionally, the goal of efficiency needs to be weighed in conjunction
with considerations of distributive equity. A least-net-cost solution
would likely seem less attractive if the costs are unduly borne by any
one segment of the affected public.
It seems reasonable then, as a second-best approach, to judge the
quality of decisions at least in part by inputs that are observable and
thus manageable. For example, were decisions based on a shared
understanding of the problem under examination? Was the most
current and reliable information brought to bear? Did decision makers
have the benefit of well-informed arguments for contending
positions? Were efforts made to curb the kinds of decisional bias that
can skew group interaction? Were efforts made to ensure that
recommendations would not disproportionately burden persons or
interests who went unrepresented in the decisional process? Given
these criteria, we should want a model for public participation that
makes the development of a coherent, shared understanding of the
issue most likely, and which brings to the forefront the best
information and the strongest arguments from a truly inclusive group.
As for enhancing legitimacy, three factors would seem to loom
largest. The first is whether the deliberation was representative of the
affected public which, in the cyber domain, is really everyone. The
second is whether there was transparency and balance in the
development and presentation of the scientific or other technical
information that set the foundation for deliberation. The third is
whether there is a credible commitment among policy makers to take
the consequences of public participation into serious account. This
need not be a commitment to do what a majority of participants
prefer, but it should be at least a commitment to explain ultimate
decisions publicly, including reasons for not acting in concert with the
public deliberation should the relevant decisions actually go that
way.4 0
Translating the general values associated with public participation
into appropriate objectives for a public participation initiative on
cybersecurity thus produces the following specifications. The project
should:
4o See DIETz & STERN, supra note 37, at 99; FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 150-58.
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* Aim at maximizing informed public awareness;
* Engage a significant representative sample of
Americans in policy deliberation;
* Facilitate discussions aimed at generating a
common, coherent understanding of the
problems under consideration;
* Involve the most reliable current information;
* Publicize the sources of information being
discussed and the processes by which that
information was produced;
* Expose participants to strong arguments for all
contending positions;
* Deploy best practices in terms of reducing the
influence of group processes that reduce the
quality of deliberative outcomes; and
* Entail a commitment by relevant policy makers
to take the recommendations of the public
participants into serious account, including a
commitment to offer public reasons for not
following any recommendations that the
majority of public deliberators favor.
This list of objectives appears yet more appropriate because of
what Jeffrey Hunker and Terrence Kelly argue in their introduction
are the prerequisites for success in the formulation and
implementation of public policy. Distilling from their own government
experience, they identify the four foundational requirements as:
1. Clear statements of what the policy is to achieve (goals)
and acceptable approaches to achieving these goals,
derived from consensus among key stakeholders;
2. Authorities that permit government to act;
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3. Resources-both fiscal and human-to implement the
proposed policy; and
4. Government organizations that have the capabilities
(e.g., organizational structure, skills, knowledge,
relationships within government and with the private
sector), and capacity (i.e., resources-mostly people
and fiscal resources) required to implement policy.4'
Public participation alone cannot yield all of these elements. Yet, it is
easy to imagine designing a process aimed explicitly at Point 1. If the
process works well, public support for developing Points 2 through 4
could significantly increase. Government agencies should thus view
public participation not only as a tool for policy development per se,
but also as providing an opportunity for the kind of public education
and mobilization that can yield increases in the human, fiscal and
legal resources that are essential to agency success.
III. MODELS FOR PUBLIC INPUT
Requirements for public input in connection with public policy
making are hardly new to the United States. Public hearings are part
and parcel of the decision making process for agencies at every level of
government. Federal and state governments typically require
opportunities for public comment to accompany significant proposals
for new administrative regulations.42 These opportunities, while taken
seriously by agencies at the federal level at least, suffer from obvious
deficiencies. The pattern of public participation is uneven, and the
connection between public input and policy outcomes uncertain.43 The
Obama Administration has worked to expand public input
opportunities, chiefly through online sites for policy discussion,
proposal review, and petitioning.44 It has even experimented with
41 Kelly & Hunker, supra note 14.
42 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring that federal administrative agencies provide
public comment opportunities for most agency rule making).
43 See generally Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (4th ed. 2010).
44 Peter M. Shane, Online Consultation and Political Communication in the Era of Obama,
in CONNECTING DEMOCRACY: ONLINE CONSULTATION AND THE FLOW OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION 1 (Stephen Coleman & Peter M. Shane eds., forthcoming Dec. 2012). The
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public collaboration in policy drafting via wiki technologies.45 None of
these models, however, is well-designed to meet the objectives
identified above as appropriate for a public participation project on
cybersecurity. None is representative. None is structured to maximize
the quality of information input or to facilitate fully engaged
deliberation. None is consciously designed to reduce the influence of
social and cognitive processes that degrade the quality of decision
making.
A well-entrenched and more meaningful example of government
initiative to engage the public in deliberations on technology policy is
the Danish consensus conference.46 Under this model, the Danish
Board of Technology (DBT) organizes formal meetings between panels
of experts and lay panels of concerned citizens, which result in reports
and recommendations by the lay panels that are directed to the
relevant decision makers, as well as to the public more generally. Each
such conference lasts for three days and is open to the public,
although panel participants commit to two additional preparatory
weekends, as well as additional time reading briefing materials.
Significant responsibility for staging a consensus conference rests
with a project manager, who is an employee of the DBT's Secretariat.
The project manager works with the DBT to create a steering
committee for the conference, to arrange for the selection of experts,
and to recruit both the lay panel members and a professional lay
facilitator. Members of the public must apply to be considered for lay
panel membership, but the project manager and steering committee
select their ultimate group of ten to fourteen deliberators to be diverse
in outlook and according to a variety of socio-economic criteria.
It is the responsibility of the steering committee to determine how
information will be assembled into briefing materials for participants.
In order to assist in gathering ideas, the steering committee may
provide for a written or live hearing among interested stakeholders.
The project manager may ultimately be asked to produce the
conference briefing paper from existing research sources, or to hire an
external writer to do the work. Responsibility for final approval of the
briefing materials rests with the steering committee.
Obama White House e-petitioning site called, "We the People," appears at
https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petitions (last vitisted Mar. 10, 2012).
45 Shane, supra note 44, at 10-11.
46 Details of the Danish consensus conference process are drawn from Grundahl, supra
note 6.
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The preparatory weekends held prior to the actual conference are
devoted chiefly to the lay panel's formulation of questions to be posed
to the expert panel. The lay panel also expresses its preferences for the
kinds of experts from whom it wishes to hear. The first day and a half
of the actual consensus conference is devoted to expert presentations
that are responsive to the panel's questions, after which the lay panel
prepares its final document. The lay panel presents its report on the
third day, at which point the experts and the public audience have the
opportunity to direct questions and reactions to the lay panel. The
reports can become influential in a way that belies each panel's small
size. That is because the media generally provides strong coverage of
the conferences, which may, in turn, further motivate policy makers'
interest in appearing responsive.
Although institutionalized public outreach of this sort is
commendable, the consensus conference model would not be ideal for
federal cybersecurity deliberations in the United States. Most
obviously, it is not a reliably representative process. But just as
worrisome, its information gathering protocol is probably not as well
suited to a national community that is far larger and more diverse
than Denmark. To put the matter bluntly, having a three-to-five-
member committee of government appointees and their designated
project manager put together the briefing materials on which the
deliberation is based is not likely to inspire trust in the deliberative
outcome among a polity as polarized and often as cynical as the
American public.
Domestically, the science-infused policy arena in which public
participation is most often incorporated is decision making involving
the environment. Such participation may take the form of public
meetings and hearings, advisory committees, various forms of
mediation, or negotiated rulemaking. Although participants regard
the last of these models-negotiated rulemakings47-as producing a
variety of positive outcomes, including better-quality decisions,48 the
model is not likely to work any better than the consensus conference
for the cybersecurity policy domain. Negotiated rulemaking is
premised on a finding that there exist only "a limited number of
identifiable interests that will be significantly affected by the rule"49 in
47 The process was created by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. H§ 561-570(a)
(2006).
48 DIETZ & STERN, supra note 37, at 78.
49 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(2)(20o6).
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question, and usually on the adequacy of a committee comprising no
more than twenty-five members to represent those interests.5o For the
overarching cyber policy questions facing the U.S., these premises are
patently unrealistic.
A form of structured interaction among lay citizens and experts
that responds directly to the mismatch between the most appropriate
roster of cyber policy participation objectives and the design of either
consensus conferences or negotiated rulemaking is "deliberative
polling," pioneered by philosopher and political scientist James
Fishkin.51 When a sponsor entity decides to launch a Deliberative Poll
(DP), it typically works with an outside neutral consultant-frequently
Professor Fishkin himself-to create an advisory committee of
stakeholders. The consultant arranges for one or more researchers to
assemble briefing materials, which are vetted by the stakeholders. The
aim is not a consensus document-if consensus were possible, no
deliberation would likely be required-but a fair presentation of all
competing perspectives. The representatives of competing interests in
the advisory group must all agree that the briefing materials fairly
represent their respective points of view.
Participants in a DP are chosen by random sampling, which is the
key factor that differentiates Deliberative Polling from other models.52
A random sample is assembled from the relevant jurisdiction-from
local to national-that is large enough to yield 150 to 300 or more
participants for the actual face-to-face interaction. All individuals
targeted for potential recruitment participate in an initial survey prior
to being invited to participate in the face-to-face discussions. This
method allows a careful comparison of the group that participates and
the group that declines. It assures that the representativeness of the
original sample is not lost because the group that agrees to participate
is distinctively different in attitudes or demographics from the overall
random sample. If the sponsors of a deliberation judge that the
relevant population includes a subgroup whose participation is
critical, but which is too small in size to be assured any representation
at all in a random sample-for example, Aboriginals in Australia
participating in a national deliberation on policy toward
Aboriginals53-that group may be oversampled to ensure some
50 5 U.S.C. § 565(b)(2Oo6).
51 See generally FISHKIN, supra note 4.
52 See generally id. at 25-28, 111-19.
53 Id. at 161-63.
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ultimate presence. In contemplating any potential national DP on
cyber policy, however, it seems unlikely that any oversampling would
be necessary. The deliberating group could be genuinely
representative.
The survey respondents who accept the invitation for a weekend of
face-to-face deliberation are compensated modestly for their
participation. Upon arrival at the deliberation site, they are randomly
assigned to small groups of ten to fifteen members, each of which is
led by a trained neutral moderator. The small groups start by
discussing the briefing materials and identifying those issues or
concerns they feel the materials do not sufficiently address. These
discussions yield questions from each group that are then posed to a
group of competing experts and policy makers during a plenary
session. After one or two rounds of such discussions, the small groups
get a final opportunity to discuss the issue that is actually the focus of
the deliberative poll. Finally, the participants re-take the confidential
questionnaire they were given at first contact, in order to determine if
and in what ways the experience of deliberating affects knowledge
acquisition and opinion.
What emerges from a DP is a particular kind of democratic
recommendation. It is not a consensus -unlike a jury, the DP
participants need not reach a united verdict.54 What policy makers
learn from the DP is what a random sample of Americans thinks about
a problem if they are given a fair opportunity to understand the issues
and asked their opinion in a context in which they perceive their
contributions to be potentially consequential. In his 2009 book based,
in part, on nine nation-level DPs conducted in the U.S. and abroad
between 1995 and 2004, Professor Fishkin cites consistent and
significant evidence of attitude change as a result of the deliberative
experience.55 Deliberators experience substantial knowledge gains
with regard to both the issue in contention and the positions of
contending parties. Deliberation moves its participants towards a
more rational ordering of their own preferences. And, quite critically,
DPs have attracted a level of media attention that can affect a broader
public dialogue and attract the serious attention of policymakers.
Of course, although a deliberative body of 300 sounds significantly
more inclusive than a consensus conference of fifteen or a negotiated
rulemaking committee of twenty-five, it may still seem too small a
sample of engaged citizens to fulfill the aim of maximizing informed
54 Id. at 129, 132.
5s Id. at 134.
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public awareness. Media, however, can have a huge amplifying effect,
especially if arrangements are made beforehand to document the
deliberations through film, as well as text, and make the conversation
available to the public at large. It would also be possible to
supplement a face-to-face DP with an online version of a DP that
could substantially multiply the number of citizens directly involved.56
It may be called into question, of course, whether even
deliberations as carefully structured as DPs will yield sound decisions
based on genuinely representative input. As summed up by Cass
Sunstein, deliberating groups "typically suffer from four problems"
undermining decisional soundness: "They amplify the errors of their
members. They do not elicit the information that their members have.
They are subject to cascade effects, producing a situation in which the
blind lead the blind. Finally, they show a tendency to group
polarization, by which groups go to extremes."57 Other democratic
theorists who have written about deliberation express concern about
the prospect that deliberative outcomes will be skewed by variously
advantaged subgroups who, by virtue of their status or manipulative
skills, will dominate group discussions.58
Beyond its capacity to catalyze public awareness and to facilitate
productive discussion around a balanced presentation of contending
positions, however, deliberative polling has also shown its value by
reducing the influence of group processes that reduce the quality of
deliberative outcomes. As reported by Fishkin, and as substantiated
by empirical study of his deliberating groups, DPs do well at avoiding
these problems.59 Three features of the DP appear critical in this
regard. First, DP groups are not solely dependent on their members'
knowledge to inform group discussion. 60 Discussions are framed by
carefully vetted and balanced presentations of well-informed and
competing views. Discussants are urged to consider what further
information they need to reach their conclusions, and are given the
opportunity to pose their questions to experts from outside their
groups. Second, the groups are conducted by trained moderators, one
56 Id. at 170-75.
57 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 75 (2006).
58 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 52-57 (2000); Lynn M.
Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POLITICAL THEORY 347 (1997).
59 FISHKIN, supra note 4, at 130.
60 Id. at 132.
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of whose primary tasks is to prevent domination. 61 A study of five U.S.
DPs found "that no particular gender, race, or demographic dominates
deliberations," and no pattern of opinion convergence towards the
initial positions held by members of higher-status groups-whites,
men, high-income participants, and the well-educated. 62 This strongly
suggests the success of the moderated structure. Finally, unlike juries
or consensus panels, participants in DPs are not required to reach a
unanimous verdict of any sort. Hence, there is simply less social
pressure to converge on a single point of view. Fishkin's analysis of
fifteen DPs studied for polarization effects found that the groups were
just as likely to converge to the mean point of view as to push away
from it in an extreme direction. Although there was some modest
evidence of a homogenization of group views, 63 it seemed as likely to
be the outcome of the thoughtful weighing of competing alternatives
as the product of "groupthink."64
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage to a DP on cyber policy would
be the expense entailed in assembling a genuinely representative
sample. There are variants of the DP experienceBritish Columbia's
Citizen Assembly, which proposed a series of electoral reforms in that
province, is likely the most famous6 5-that strongly resemble DPs in
some of their elements, but are more tolerant of self-selection in the
recruitment of deliberators. It might be argued that the lengths to
which DPs go to provide guarantees of representativeness adequate to
assure social scientists of their integrity might be more rigorous than
necessary. Some mixture of demographic screening and the
acceptance of volunteers might be enough to generate the kind of
national microcosm that would appear both to relevant policy makers
and to the general public to be representative enough to be worthy of
serious attention. The American public, however, is currently both so
polarized-as are its policy makers-and so distrustful of public
institutions that the extra care necessary to insure the
61 Id.
62 Id. at 130.
63 Id. at 131-132.
64 Id. at 132.
65Making Every Vote Count: The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia, BRITISH
COLUMBIA CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM (2004),
http://ww w.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final report.pdf.
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representativeness of a deliberative forum might prove a sound
investment in eliciting public confidence in the process. Among the
available models for public participation in policy making, deliberative
polling or its equivalent would seem most likely to fulfill the
appropriate objectives for public participation in the cyber policy
realm.
IV. THE CASE FOR COLLABORATIVE CYBER POLICY MAKING
The U.S. currently faces cyber policy issues that raise questions of
value and general direction susceptible to intelligent discussion by
non-specialists. Public participation has long been linked to a series of
benefits for governance that are salient in the realm of cyber policy.
Models of lay deliberation exist that are well designed to achieve those
benefits. Powerful questions remain, however, about the role of a
deliberative public in making government policy and whether public
participation-even if attractive in principle-can be designed
effectively to ward off predictable sources of frustration and poor
quality.
The case for public participation in policy making has both
normative and instrumental aspects. The core normative proposition
is that genuinely democratic governance must entail public
participation. With the exception of purely procedural theories, in
which democracy means little more than institutionalized electoral
competition under fair conditions, contemporary political theorists
have coalesced around what the NRC has called "a remarkable
consensus" on three key elements of democracy: political equality,
popular sovereignty, and human development.66 By definition,
political equality entails the right of every citizen to participate in
making public policy. Popular sovereignty proposes that democratic
citizens be governed only by laws to which they give consent in some
meaningful way. Human development captures the idea that
democratic participation not only allows citizens to promote their
interests, but represents "an important means through which they
come to understand their interests in the first place and how those
interests relate to and depend on those of other citizens." 67
Democracy, in this last sense, is a system of "experiential learning."
There is thus a direct link between citizen involvement in policy
66 DIETZ & STERN, supra note 37, at 46.
67 Id. at 47.
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making and each feature of governance that is now regarded as
foundational to democracy.
It is understandable however, that policy makers-both elected
and appointed-may undervalue such normative commitments in
structuring the concrete policy processes in which they participate.
The good that may come from fulfilling these democratic
commitments is likely to be felt only gradually and over a diffuse
population. In the short-term, elected policy makers may well be
focused primarily on their immediate political fortunes, while
appointees seek to demonstrate the kinds of concrete progress in the
achievement of immediate bureaucratic goals that will warrant
continuing resource support adequate to meet near-term challenges
on behalf of well-defined constituencies.
It is hard to imagine a time, however, in which the case for some
"loftier," long-term thinking would be more urgent. Public confidence
in governing institutions has never been lower, and the public's
alienation from elected authorities never greater. 68 The outpouring of
right and left-wing populist energy, embodied respectively in the Tea
Party and Occupy movements, testifies eloquently to Americans'
widespread cynicism about the capacities and motivations of
governing elites. 69 Meaningful efforts to reconnect everyday citizens
with their governing institutions are urgently required to reestablish
public trust. In their absence, a wave of general anti-government
sentiment may make it impossible for any agency, no matter how
68 Lydia Saad, Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions: Fifty percent "very
little"/"no" confidence in Congress reading is record high, GALLUP (July 22, 2010),
http://ww w.gallup.com/poll/141512/congress-ranks-last-confidence-institutions.aspx.
Professor Lawrence Lessig puts the point dramatically:
At what point do we declare an institution politically bankrupt,
especially an institution that depends fundamentally upon public trust
and confidence to do its work? When the czar of Russia was ousted by
the Bolsheviks, he had the confidence of more than 11 percent of the
Russian people. When Louis XVI was deposed by the French
Revolution, he had the confidence of more than 11 percent of the
French. And when we waged a Revolutionary War against the British
Crown, more than 11 percent of the American people had confidence in
King George III.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT 247 (2011).
69 Bruce Reyes-Chow, The Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street Movements: Similarities and
Differences, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-
reyeschow/tea-party-occupy-movement b 1o62824.html.
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urgent its mission, to garner the public support necessary to do jobs
that need doing. In the cyber realm, for example, there is credible
"worry that cuts being mulled over by Congress and the White House
could sink the nation's nascent cyber defenses."7o
Cyber policy makers, moreover, ought to recognize that public
participation in their domain may also furnish practical benefits that
will enhance their mission, even in the relatively short term. Public
participation can aid in agenda setting by clarifying the problems that
need to be addressed and the priorities that ought to attach to them.
The public may bring to decision makers' attention potential impacts
of different policies that might not otherwise be considered, as well as
information about the potential distribution of burdens and benefits.
The perspective of outsiders might be especially useful in assessing the
credibility of information that policy makers have gathered, and in
testing the logic that, in the minds of policy makers, links potential
policies to desired objectives. In the realm of environmental policy,
the NRC, after an exhaustive review of available case studies and
survey and experimental research, concluded that, on average, public
participation enhances the quality and legitimacy of environmental
decisions, as well as the capacity of both experts and the lay public to
make better decisions in the future.71 There is no obvious reason why
the outcome should be different in the cyber realm, where the mix of
fact and value inputs is similarly complex and positive impacts are
likely to depend on the behaviors of multiple groups of actors,
including private citizens.
The most intense objections from agency policy makers are likely
to appear in the form of doubts as to the utility of deliberation with
non-experts. In research I did in 2009 on early efforts by the current
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) leadership to expand
public input in FCC decision making,72 a number of senior staff
expressed genuine uncertainty as to the role non-expert opinion was
supposed to play in their decision making. In the words of one staff
member, "Aren't we supposed to be the expert agency? What's the
general public going to tell me about the hard technical choices we
70 Jennifer Martinez, Balancing Act: Cybersecurity vs. Cuts, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2011, 10:12
PM), http://wwx-.politico.com/news/stories/1oll/66665.html.
71 DIETZ & STERN, supra note 37, at 76.
72 Peter M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the Administrative State: A
Case Study of the Federal Communications Commission, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 485
(2011).
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face that I do not already know?"73 Such an objection, however,
ignores two critical points. The first is that decision making confined
to experts is prone to its own kinds of deficiencies. Happily, evidence
does suggest that "experts are less likely to make certain sorts of
predictable errors, such as overestimating the likely recurrence of
vivid events, and more likely to gain some adaptive ability to
overcome erroneous judgments as a result of repeat encounters with
specific factual scenarios."74 Experts, however:
are subject to three distinct biases of their own. First,
they are likely to overestimate their actual knowledge.
In the experimental setting, they demonstrate levels of
confidence in their judgments that exceed the actual
advantages conferred by their expertise, the propensity
to be "often wrong, but never in doubt." Second, they
are likely to adopt a world view that turns largely on
the area of their expertise and are unable to weigh its
relative merits against other matters outside the zone
of their expertise . . . Third, and relatedly, they are
subject to routinized ways of approaching problems
and to an unreflective "group think" style of inbred
behavior.75
Melding expert analysis with broad-based deliberation can help offset
each of these biases.
Indeed, public deliberation may be critical for countering the
tendency among experts to pose problems solely within the technical
frameworks with which they feel most comfortable. Whether to devote
public resources to better firewalls, for example, or to various kinds of
"workarounds" that would permit critical infrastructure to function
even in the face of cyber aggression is a determination as likely to
involve political, social, and economic tradeoffs as it is a technical
assessment regarding the possible success of such strategies. So are
decisions regarding our national doctrine on cyber war, investments
in systems designed to improve cyber attribution, the allocation of
cyber authority among military and civilian authorities, and the scope
73 Private communication.
74 Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court ofPublic Law, 87 CORNELL
L. REv. 671, 675 (2002).
75 Id.
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of presidential authority over the Internet. One does not have to
impute ill motive to imagine how specialists in law, economics,
military science, and information science might be tempted to
characterize these issues as "ultimately" about legality, efficiency,
operations research, or sound management. All of these disciplines
are implicated, but so are public values regarding liberty, privacy,
accountability, and competing priorities. These values should not be
subordinated in the creation of public policy.
The second point is that good design for a policy process intended
from the outset to accommodate non-expert policy input is quite likely
to improve the quality of the relevant technical analysis as well. In
studying the processes by which the public has been involved in
environmental assessment and risk analysis more generally, the NRC
has advanced five requisites for effectively "melding scientific analysis
and public participation."76 These are:
1. ensuring transparency of decision-relevant information
and analysis,
2. paying explicit attention to both facts and values,
3. promoting explicitness about assumptions and
uncertainties,
4. including independent review of official analyses
and/or engaging in a process of collaborative inquiry
with interested and affected parties, and
5. allowing for iteration to reconsider past conclusions on
the basis of new information.7 7
Determined planning for the fourth of these steps-the actual stage of
public participation-would appear to be an especially promising
strategy for making sure the first three of these requirements are met.
That is, the administrators in charge of organizing public input are
likely to be strongly positioned to insist that the relevant teams of
experts identify both the assumptions and sources of information that
underlay their analyses, the degree of uncertainty that attends their
76 DIETZ & STERN, supra note 37, at 3.
Id.
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conclusions, and the value questions to which their analyses are
actually directed. This is a level of clarity likely to be of enormous help
not only to the citizen-deliberators, but also to the agency policy
makers to whom the experts are intended to be accountable. Technical
analysis that meets these requirements is quite likely to be more
thoughtful technical analysis.
There is no guarantee, of course, that a public participation project
will yield these kinds of benefits. Certainly, there are public
participation initiatives that have not been successful. But the design
of the process is critical:
The way a public participation process is conducted can
have more influence on overall success than the type of
issue, the level of government involved, or even the
quality of preexisting relationships among the parties.
Thus, those variables over which the convening agency
has the greatest control turn out to be key to achieving
the desired results.78
According to the NRC: "The evidence indicates that public
participation processes have better results when they follow basic
principles of program management: clarity of purpose, commitment,
adequate resources, appropriate timing, an implementation focus, and
a commitment to learning."79 Beyond these basic principles, however,
the experience of participation needs itself to be designed in a way
most likely to elicit the payoffs most valuable in the policy domain at
issue. Some version of deliberative polling, supported by an agency (or
coalition of agencies) with both a clear sense of objectives and a
willingness to commit explicitly "to supporting the process and taking
seriously the results,"8 o seems tailor-made for connecting the public to
public policy in the cyber realm.
V. CONCLUSION
The state of cybersecurity policy making in the United States is
plainly unsatisfactory. Lines of decisional authority in the government
are unclear. Adequate leverage over the management of private
78 Id. at 95.
79 Id. at 109.
8o Id. at 99.
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infrastructure is uncertain. The public is largely oblivious to the
dimensions of the problem and the government's policy directions in
response to it. It is unlikely that current laws are doing what needs to
be done in terms of incentivizing responsible behavior on the part of
those most able to shoulder the costs of improving security. As a
consequence, the cyber realm appears well-characterized by Jeffrey
Hunker as plagued by "creeping failure."81 Cyberspace is not so linked
(yet) with any catastrophic consequence as to motivate a concentrated
public response and yet, day by day, year by year, it bears enormous
social costs with the proliferation of cyber aggression, both criminal
and political.
There is no particular reason for this situation to change unless an
informed public is motivated around the issue of cybersecurity to help
mobilize government in the direction of real solutions. Laden as it is
with science and technology, the cyber realm may seem a daunting
frontier on which to launch newly ambitious forms of public
engagement, but its seeming obscurity may be an advantage, as well.
That is, cybersecurity is not a subject on which citizens are likely to
begin from a hugely polarized stance. Our racial, ethnic, gender,
religious, and partisan identities are unlikely to be deeply implicated
in cybsersecurity deliberations. Cyber may thus be an ideal realm
around which the government could try to organize the citizenry into
conversations, both with each other and with government, that truly
deepen the experience of democratic citizenship.12
It is not as if agencies within our government have not already
thought of this at some level. For example, on September 21, 2011, the
Federal Register published a notice from the Departments of
Commerce and Homeland Security requesting public comment on a
voluntary industry code of conduct for notifying consumers when
their computers have been used illicitly by botnets.8 3 This is an
excellent topic for citizen input. Following the close of the comment
period, a visit to the online compendium of public responses revealed
81 HUNKER, supra note 7, at 8.
82 Stephen Coleman, Making the E-Citizen: A Sociotechnical Approach to Democracy,
CONNECTING DEMOCRACY: ONLINE CONSULTATION AND THE FLOW OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION 379 (Stephen Coleman & Peter M. Shane, eds., forthcoming Dec. 2012).
83 Models to Advance Voluntary Corporate Notification to Consumers Regarding the
Illicit Use of Computer Equipment by Botnets and Related Malware, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,466
(Sept. 21, 2011).
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exactly nine submissions by the original November 4, 2011 deadline.84
Only eighteen more comments85 resulted from a ten-day extension of
the comment period. 86 We know how to do democracy better than
this. All that is required is will.
VI. APPENDIX: A SCENARIO FOR PUBLIC DELIBERATION
The April, 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review declares:
"The United States needs to conduct a national dialogue on
cybersecurity to develop more public awareness of the threat and risks
and to ensure an integrated approach toward the Nation's need for
security and the national commitment to privacy rights and civil
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and law."8 7 The most effective
mechanism for galvanizing such a dialogue would be a blue-ribbon
national commission, like the 9/11 Commission,88 the Carnegie
Commission that led to the creation of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, 89 or the Kerner Commission9o that looked into the
causes of the 196os' race riots in the United States. Assuming such a
commission were either chartered by statute-the ideal situation-or
organized as a federal advisory committee,91 it would be perfectly
situated to sponsor a deliberative poll on critical aspects of cyber
84 Models To Advance Voluntary Corporate Notification to Consumers Regarding the
Illicit Use of Computer Equipment by Botnets and Related Malware: Comments received
in Response to Federal Register Notice 110829543-1541-ol, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS
AND TECH. (NOV. 21, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/botnetcomments.cfm.
85 Id.
86 National Protection and Programs Directorate; Models To Advance Voluntary Corporate
Notification to Consumers Regarding the Illicit Use of Computer Equipment by Botnets
and Related Malware; Extension of Comment Period, 76 Fed. Reg. 68, 16o (Nov. 3, 2011).
87 THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2009),
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace-Policy Review final.pdf.
88 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S., THE 9/11 COMMIssIoN REPORT
(2004).
89 CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR
ACTION (1967).
90 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
915 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
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policy. The following is an outline of the organizational steps that
would be entailed in staging that deliberative poll.
1. After doing its preliminary "environmental scan" of the
relevant issues, the commission would frame the
question or questions for public deliberation. Examples
might be, "How much authority should rest with the
Department of Defense for protecting civilian computer
networks in the United States?" or, "How should the
United States direct the investment of budgetary
resources to advance the goals of cybersecurity?"
2. The commission would issue a request for proposals for
a nonpartisan, nonprofit entity to serve as process
consultant for the deliberative poll.
3. The consultant, in consultation with the commission,
would assemble an advisory committee for the
deliberative poll. The advisory committee would be
selected to represent identifiable interests both within
and outside government that could be significantly
affected by new policy, and a wide range of political and
philosophical perspectives. The key tasks of the
advisory committee would be to select a diverse group
of experts to participate in the deliberative poll and to
vet the briefing materials to insure that each competing
perspective on every question was presented fairly and
to the satisfaction of its advocates.
4. The consultant, working with the commission, would
develop a media plan to ensure widespread and in-
depth coverage of the deliberative poll as it evolves. All
materials prepared for the deliberative poll would be
made available online, along with opportunities for
members of the public to discuss those materials.
5. Under the consultant's supervision, a random sample
of Americans would be surveyed on the questions on
which the deliberative poll is focusing. The sample
would be large enough to provide reasonable assurance
that 300 volunteers would emerge from the group to
engage in actual deliberations.
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6. Every person who responds to the survey would be
invited to participate in the deliberative poll. Because
face-to-face deliberation is ideal, participants would be
offered financial assistance to cover their travel and a
small stipend for their work.
7. The deliberative poll would be conducted, presumably
in Washington, D.C., over the course of a weekend. As
is typical, participants would be organized into small
groups on arrival and would deliberate initially on the
adequacy of the briefing materials and questions left
unanswered. Questions formulated by the groups
would then be posed to the diverse panel of experts.
Participants would then continue to deliberate in small
groups, leading to a final, confidential survey of the
participants.
8. Raw results of the poll would be announced
immediately, while the consultant would commence
preparing a detailed report summarizing highlights of
the discussions and placing the results in context.
9. A public hearing of the commission would be convened
following the submission of the final report, at which
time the commission would formally respond to the
poll's recommendations. In the intervening months,
public television will have broadcast a documentary
about the deliberations, newspapers, magazines, and
blogs will have covered the issues extensively, and
Congress would be gearing up for its own public
hearings in response to the commission's
recommendations.
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